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A SECRET SOCIETY: HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR
MYSTERIOUS SUCCESS
Matthew Goldstein*

INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC" or
"Commission") "Hedge Fund Rule."' This act vacated the SEC's requirement
for hedge funds and their advisers to register with the SEC and to release
significant financial and management disclosures to the public. According to
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Hofstra University School of Law. First and foremost, I wish to express the
utmost appreciation for the hard work and effort of the senior staff of the Journal of International
Business and Law, in particular my Notes and Comments Editor, Ms. Shari Cherno. I would like to
thank Dean Miriam Albert for her encouragement and meaningful advice. Also, I want to express
my love and gratitude for my girlfriend, Cassie, for believing in me. Lastly, but by no means least, I
would like to dedicate this note to my family, Leslie, Barry and Mark Goldstein, whose
unconditional support has been the invaluable element of my success.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining that the hedge fund rule which had
required investors in a hedge fund to be counted as clients of the fund's adviser was ruled invalid);
see also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054,
74,059 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 275, 279). See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)
(2006) (A private fund is an investment company that (a) is exempt from the registration process
under the 40 Act by virtue of having fewer than one hundred investors or only qualified investors
and (b) permits its investors to redeem their interests within two years of investing and (c) markets
itself on the basis of the skills, ability or expertise of the investment adviser; see also 17 C.F.R. §
275.203(b)(3)-l(d)(l) (2006). For these private funds the rule specifies that "for purposes of section
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, you must count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, members
or beneficiaries of the fund. The rule had the effect of requiring most hedge fund advisers to
register by February 1, 2006).
2 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880; see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (explaining that private fund or hedge fund advisers, prior to the D.C.
Circuit vacating the Hedge Fund Rule, were required to file Form ADV with the SEC, the data from
which will provide the Commission with information they need to better understand the operation of
hedge fund advisers, to plan examinations, to better develop regulatory policy and to provide data
and information to members of Congress and other government agencies. The form ADV was
amended to include hedge funds by labeling them as "private funds." Registration requires hedge
funds to adopt compliance policies and procedures and appoint a chief compliance officer. The
hedge fund advisers are subject to Advisers Act requirements regarding examinations by the SEC,
recordkeeping, personal securities transaction reporting, custody, voting of proxies, an insider
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the D.C. Circuit, the SEC exceeded its authority by abruptly attempting to
regulate a notoriously complex industry whose business model is far too
complicated for the average investor to understand.3 The Commission adopted
the Staff Report's primary recommendation by voting three to two in favor of
requiring hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act").4 Subsequent to the SEC's
regulation to require certain hedge fund managers to register with the SEC, an
investment advisory firm, Kimball & Winthrop and Opportunity Partners, L.P.,
a hedge fund in which Kimball & Winthrop is the general partner and
investment adviser (collectively "Goldstein") successfully challenged
the Hedge
5
Fund Rule's equation of the term "client" with the term "investor."
Specifically, the SEC amended Rule 203(b)(3)-1 ("Safe Harbor Rule")
under the Advisers Act, effectively removing a provision which provided an
exemption for registration for hedge fund advisers. 6 In other words, prior to the

trading policy, use of performance data and other advertising activities, as well as a limitation on
when a registered adviser may charge its clients performance based fees. With respect to the
recordkeeping requirements, the Form ADV amendment specified that a registered adviser's books
and records also include the books and records of any private fund which it advises and for which it
or any of its related persons act as the private fund's general partner or managing member.
Registration via form ADV is accomplished by way of the SEC's Division of Investment
Management Electronic Filing for Investment Advisers on the Investment Adviser Registration
Depositor ("IARD") and usually may take up to 45 days to file properly); See also Division of
Investment Management: Electronic Filing for Investment Advisers on IARD, available at
http://www.sec.gov/iard (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
3 Adam R. Bolter, Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers: A Valid Exercise of Rulemaking Authority
or the Promulgation of New Law?, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 595, 596 (2005); see also S.E.C.,
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds (2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/hedgefunds09O3.pdf (summarizing a study of 65 registered and unregistered
hedge fund advisers indicating that there are approximately 7,000 hedge funds operating in the
United States, managing approximately $870 billion in assets).
4 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054;
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a) (stating that "you may deem the following to be a single client for
purposes of section 203(b)(3) of the [Advisers] Act: (2)(i)...A corporation, general partnership,
limited partnership, limited liability company, trust (...), or other legal organization (...) to which
you provide investment advice based on its investment objectives rather than the individual
investment objectives of its shareholders, partners, limited partners, members or beneficiaries"); see
also Lowe v. S.E.C. 472 U.S. 181, 194 (1985) (explaining that when Congress passed the
Investment Company Act in 1940, Congress also passed the Advisers Act as a companion statute to
regulate persons who provide personalized investment advice to others for compensation).
5 See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874 (explaining that the petition for review originated by Philip
Goldstein, portfolio manager of Opportunity Partners LP, alleged the SEC exceeded its authority by
making new law, a process delegated to Congress).
6 Id. at 875; see also S.E.C., supra note 3, at 88-89 (discussing the purposes of exposing the hedge
fund advisers to the SEC registration requirements. The SEC shall look through the entity and
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implementation of the Hedge Fund Rule, the Safe Harbor Rule, provided
managers of "private funds" relief from counting each investor in a hedge fund
as a separate client. As a large majority of hedge funds have more than the
fourteen investor statutory maximum ("fifteen client rule") the vacated client
counting rule had "precluded most managers
from relying on the 'small adviser'
7
exemption under the Advisers Act.",
This Note argues that the D.C. Circuit was correct in its invalidation of
the Hedge Fund Rule and that the SEC exceeded its regulatory authority by
arbitrarily construing the meaning of the "Hedge Fund Rule" beyond the
interpretation intended by Congress. However, given the nature of the hedge
fund industry and its complicated business models, the SEC was consistent with
its regulatory goal of promoting investor protection, although a distinct attempt
by the SEC must be explored. Part I of this Note provides an explanation of the
business model for a typical hedge fund and the relative lack of regulation the
privatized industry has attracted. Furthermore, it will explain the lack of a
concrete statutory definition of a hedge fund and the key differences between
the trading strategies hedge funds and other investment vehicles such as those
entities subject to the Advisers Act administer. Part II of this Note analyzes the
SEC's authority to enact the Hedge Fund Rule, its legislative history and
purpose and whether or not the effects of the rule were consistent with the
SEC's intent in amending Rule 203(b)(3)-1. Part III of this Note analyzes the
D.C. Circuit's decision in Goldstein v. SEC, the implications of the holding and
whether the court was correct in its determination that the "look through"
provision of the private adviser exemption does not permit the SEC to equate
the term "client" with the term "investor" of a hedge fund. Part IV concludes
by recommending alternative regulatory mechanisms by which the SEC may
affect the hedge fund industry in a manner which is rationally related to the
Commission's concerns for investor protection rather than by an arbitrary
attempt to require the hedge fund's advisers to register with the SEC.8 Finally,
this Note will explore the alternative regulatory mechanisms implemented
internationally.

count each individual investor as a client, rather than refer to the hedge fund itself as the client).
7 See Bolter, supra note 3, at 596; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006) (identifying the
prerequisites for the small investment adviser exemption: (1)the adviser must have fewer than 15
clients; (2) must not hold itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser; and (3) cannot
act as an investment adviser to a registered investment company or business development
company).
8 S.E.C. Decides It Won't Appeal on Hedge Funds,N.Y. TIMES, August 8, 2006, at Cl.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS
A. Overview of the Hedge Fund Structure
The federal securities laws of the United States do not define the term
"hedge fund." However, a hedge fund has been defined as "a privately offered
investment vehicle that pools the contributions of its investors in order to invest
in a variety of asset classes," 9 such as debt and equity securities, future
contracts l° , options t", over-the-counter derivatives' 2 and foreign currencies.
The expectation is that hedge funds will generate positive returns in both bull
and bear markets. 13 Initially, the term "hedge" derived from the fund taking
both long' 4 and short15 positions in debt and equity securities in order to ensure
or offset inherent investment or market risks, a strategy of "hedging an
investment portfolio."' 6 Hedge funds are typically structured as limited
partnerships, limited liability companies or in other business organizational

9 David A. Vaughan, Selected Definition of "Hedge Fund" (2003),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (citing fourteen different definitions
found in government and industry publications).
10 Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund RegulationNecessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681 (2000) (defining a
future as "standardized agreement that requires the delivery of some underlying commodity or
financial instrument at a future date at a specified price.").
" Id. at 684, 715 n.20 (splitting options into two categories whereby a call option will give an
investor a right, but not the obligation to buy a specified financial instrument during a specific time
period, as distinguished from a put option whereby the investor is given the right to sell).
2 Id. at 684, 715 n.21 (defining over-the-counter derivatives as "bilateral agreements that derive
their value from an underling asset, such as stocks, commodities, or currency holdings, or from the
value of an underlying reference or index rate, such as interest rates, exchange rate or indices").
13 "A bull market is a prolonged period of time when prices are rising in a financial market faster
than the historical average in contrast to a bear market which is a prolonged period of time when
prices are falling." Alternatively, a financial market is generally successful when the bulls or buyers
outnumber the bears or sellers, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullmarket.
14 Long (or Long Position) is defined as the buying of a security such as a stock, commodity or
currency, with the expectation that the asset will rise in value,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-position.
15 Short (or Short Position) is defined as the sale of a borrowed security, commodity or currency
with the expectation that the asset will fall in value,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_%28finance%29. (The use of short selling by hedge funds has
led to allegations that some hedge funds may be engaging in short selling as part of a manipulative
scheme as alleged by issuers who claim that hedge funds accumulate bearish or short positions in
their stocks and subsequently issue reports to drive down the security prices.); see also Judith
Chase, The State of Hedge Funds, SIA Research Reports, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March 10, 2003).
16 Gibson, supra note 10, at 715 n.18 (The first hedge fund was established by A.W. Jones in 1949
where he implemented a system of taking long and short positions in securities so that it would
generate returns in both bullish and bearish markets).
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forms that provide for pass-through tax treatment of investor earnings. 7 Given
the very high levels of capital and leverage utilized in a hedge fund's
investments, "hedge funds cater to sophisticated investors and [more
importantly] are not subject to the [SEC] regulations that apply to mutual funds
geared towards the general public." 18 Since hedge funds generally trade
securities on a secondary basis whereby their interests are not sold in a
registered public offering ("IPO"), they are not subject to the registration
requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("'40 Act"). 19 As an
alternative, to maximize flexibility, hedge funds typically offer their
investments structured as private placement or Rule 144 transactions20,
offerings exempted from the federal securities registration laws. 21 As hedge
funds predominately attract wealthy and sophisticated investors, it is fitting they
comprise only a small portion of the investing community.22 In fact, hedge
funds typically have either no more than one hundred beneficial owners 23 or
require their investors to meet rigid minimum size requirements.24Management
7 Report of the President'sWorking Group on FinancialMarkets, Hedge Funds, Leverage and the

Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,B-3 (1999),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (explaining that these forms of entities
are all treated as partnerships. A partnership structure eliminates the dividend tax levied upon
profits realized by the owners of a corporation. The dividend tax is an income tax on money paid to
the stockholders of a company through dividend payments).
'8 Vaughan, supra note 12 (quoting GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL
CAPrrALISM 32 n." (2000)).
19 S.E.C., supra note 3, at 3 (recognizing that the modem hedge fund maintains a diversified
investing strategy beyond equities).
20 S.E.C., Rule 144: Selling Restricted and ControlledSecurities (2006),
http://wwwlsec.gov/investor/pubs/rulel44.htm (explaining that Rule 144 transactions are exempt
from the registration requirements in order to sell the security in the marketplace so long as (1)
before the restricted securities are sold in the marketplace they must be held for one year; (2) there
must be adequate information available about the issuer of the securities; (3) The amount of
securities sold in any three-month period may not exceed specific volume limitations; (4) Sales
must be made in ordinary brokers' transactions or transactions directly with a market marker; (5)
The sales must not be advertised nor may additional commissions be paid and (6) A Form 144 must
be filed with the SEC). See also, S.E.C., supra note 3, at x (noting that Regulation D under the
1933 Securities Act governs private offerings offered exclusively to accredited investors).
2' Gibson, supra note 10, at 483.
22

Id. at 683.

23Report of the President's Working Group, supra note 17, at 3 (defining "beneficial owner" as one
who must have voting rights, generally owning 10% or more of the fund's voting securities, and is
either an investment company or a private fund).
24Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006) (requiring a fund relying on this exclusion to comply
with the 100 beneficial owner prerequisite. The funds are not to propose or make available its
securities in a public offering); 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c)(7) (2006) (requiring hedge funds to sell their
securities only to those persons who are qualified purchasers, or "(i) any natural person who owns
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is compensated generally by taking a percentage of the assets investors have in
their portfolios 25in addition to a percentage of the firm's profits, or a
performance fee.
B. Hedge Fund Trading Strategy
Generally, hedge funds are some of the more active trading entities
that "can provide benefits to financial markets by enhancing liquidity and
efficiency. 6 Hedge fund trading strategies are typically focused on short
selling (the sale of a borrowed security), arbitrage (simultaneously buying and
selling a security in different markets to exploit and profit from pricing
discrepancies) and leverage (magnifying returns by investing with borrowed
money).27 The use of leverage enables hedge funds to take short term positions
or sell short because the hedge fund will borrow the stock, bond or other
security instrument from a broker-dealer.28 If the security declines in price (as
compared to the selling price it initially offered) before the fund must replace
the borrowed security, the fund will realize a gain. 29 Just as easily as leverage
may result in enormous profits, the opposite can easily occur. Given this
inherent risk, the ten to twenty percent performance-based advisory fees are
presumptively justified. Still, the underlying issue with regard to leverage
surrounds the possibility of a loss. Even so, hedge funds divert large levels of
risk from those investors finding risk adverse investments attractive since hedge
funds "have a great desire to assume such risk., 30 However, excessive use of
economic leverage or a very high ratio of borrowed money to available capital
can prevent hedge funds from meeting margin calls 31 in the event hedge fund

not less than $5 million in investments, (ii) a family-owned company that owns not less than $5
million in investments, (iii) certain trusts, and (iv) any other person, (e.g. an institutional investor
that owns and invests on a discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments")).
25 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
26 Report of the President's Working Group,supra note 17, at 2.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 id.

30 Gibson, supra note 10, at 688; see also Hedgefunds: Hearing before the House Committee on

Banking and FinancialServices, 1056h Cong. (1999) (statement of Patrick M. Parkinson, Associate
Director, Division of Research and Statistic, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)

("Leverage plays a positive role in our financial system, resulting in greater market liquidity, lower
credit costs, and a more efficient allocation of resources in our economy."). See generally Report
of the President'sWorking Group, supra note 17, at 4-5.

31"When the margin posted in the margin account is below the minimum margin requirement, the
broker or exchange issues a margin call. The investor now either has to increase the margin that he
has deposited, or he can close out his position. He can do this by selling the securities, options or
futures if he is long and by buying them back if he is short,"
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strategists incorrectly predict market movements. Therefore, hedge funds are
constrained in some cases by initial margin and collateral at the transaction
level.32 To ensure the exposure of leverage is adequately collateralized relative
to the creditworthiness of the hedge fund, the leverage is acquired through
derivatives transactions, short sales and direct financing. 33 Still, the practice of
leveraging investments exerts a positive influence on a hedge fund's returns
because they are only "limited in their use of leverage by the willingness of
their creditors and counterparties to provide such leverage. 3 4 Beyond that,
regulatory capital requirements
are only applicable to financial institutions apart
35
from hedge funds.
C. Hedge Funds versus Mutual Funds
The primary difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is that
mutual funds must be registered as investment companies. Although both
entities may invest in similar types of securities and offer investors the
opportunity to diversity their investments through professionally managed
investment pools, "mutual funds do not charge performance-based advisory
fees, nor do they
typically engage in the short-term investment strategies of
36
hedge funds."
An implication of the distinct trading strategies employed by mutual
and hedge funds is the possibility of conflict of interests. For example, an
investment adviser managing a mutual fund using a long-only strategy may, at
the same time, manage a hedge fund using a different strategy. 37 "The
investment adviser may determine that an equity security that the mutual fund
holds long is appropriate for the hedge fund to sell short, 38 and in turn the short
sale may have a negative effect on the security and therefore the mutual fund's
performance. It follows that as facially similar hedge funds and mutual funds
may appear to be, their trading strategies provide for significant differences,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margin-call#Margincall; see Report of the President's Working
Group, supra note 17, at 23 (suggesting that excessive use of leverage potentially causes substantial
financial difficulties for the markets and in turn forces regulators to recognize the fears of market
disruption).
32 See Report of the President'sWorking Group, supra note 17, at 23 ("In a volatile market, high
levels of leverage increase the likelihood that a leveraged entity will fail, in part because the size of
potential losses can seriously deplete and even wipe out the entity's net worth").
33 id.

34id.
35 Id.
36 Report

of the President's Working Group, supra note 17; see also Bolter, supra note 3, at 599.
S.E.C., supra note 3, at 84; see Definition of Long Position, supra note 14.
38 S.E.C., supra note 3.
37
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substantial enough to adversely affect their respective performances.
D. Long Term Capital Management, L.P.
It may be argued that a direct result of the lack of regulatory
restrictions placed upon hedge funds is the collapse of the hedge fund Long
Term Capital Management, L.P. ("LTCM"). 39 LTCM operated Long Term
Capital Portfolio in the late 1990s when LTCM's trading strategy caused the
fund to lose substantial sums of money, through the misuse of leverage,
primarily as a result of economic problems in Russia. 4° LTCM's loss resulted
from "using borrowed money to purchase about $120 billion of its estimated
$125 billion of assets, causing the fund to be leveraged 25 times over.''41 The
problem with that approach "was that the $125 billion in capital that LTCM
raised would not be sufficient to realize substantial profits. 42 As a result,
worried creditors coupled with counterparties looked to liquidate their collateral
assets to protect themselves from the fund's failure and "bailed out the fund. 43
The Federal Reserve along with a few of the prominent banks and brokerage
houses provided a short-term solution to the LTCM problem by investing $3.65
billion in equity capital in LTCM in exchange for 90 percent of the firm's
equity, and in turn, provided to shareholders a better result and permitted
management to continue to collect their management fees. 44 However the long
term effects of the Federal Reserve's involvement was likely the eventual action
taken by the SEC.
Although not immediate, a regulatory response by the SEC was
inevitable and did eventually result in the allegedly appropriate solution of
requiring hedge fund advisers to register as authorized by the Advisers Act.
However, the stepping stone to the briefly implemented registration requirement
was the financial securities industry tightening its credit risk management
Gibson supra note 10, at 682 (explaining how the enormous size of LTCM and its trading
positions caused its counterparties and creditors to lose substantial amounts of money due to the
extension of excessive credit, and in turn, the fund's financial collapse "has led federal legislators
and financial regulators to question whether additional regulatory constraints were necessary on a
hedge fund's use of leverage to protect against financial market disruption"); see also Report of the
President'sWorking Group, supra note 17.
40 Daniel K. Liffman, Registrationof Hedge Fund Advisers Underthe Investment Advisers Act, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 2147,2172-2173 (2005).
41 Id.
42 Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC's Approach to Hedge
FundRegulation,
32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 171 (2006).
43 Liffman supra note 40 at 2173; see also Gibson, supra note 10, at 681.
44 Dillmore, supra note 42 at 173; see also Kevin Dowd, Too Big To Fail?Long-Term Capital
Management and the FederalReserve, Cato Institute Briefing Papers, (Sept. 23, 1999), availableat
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp52.pdf.
39
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practices. Additionally, "financial regulators implemented guide-lines for
regulated entities when extending credit through either lending or counterparty
relationships."45 The issues of hedge fund fraud, misuse of leverage and
speculation support the pro-registration argument and accordingly compel the
SEC to act.
Registration would provide for the SEC to "(i) begin to understand the
hedge fund industry, (ii) attempt to curb some of the illegal activity of
individual funds and their advisers, and (iii) prevent market disruptions by
monitoring overleveraged funds." 46 Although these three rationales do in fact
support the need for hedge fund regulation, the hedge fund rule encompassing
hedge fund adviser registration was not necessarily the best approach for the
SEC in their attempt to learn more about the intricacies of a hedge fund.
Concurrently, it has been suggested that "the effects of LTCM's failure on
financial markets were exaggerated" and the Federal Reserve's bailout "simply
helped the shareholders and managers of LTCM to get a better deal for
themselves than they would otherwise have obtained.4 7 Further, the bailout
may have served as a regulation wake up call for the Federal Reserve as well as
the SEC in that it "encouraged more calls for regulation of hedge-fund activity,
which may drive such activity further offshore," and "encourage irresponsible
risk taking" of large financial institutions.4a

II. THE HEDGE FUND RULE
A. The Rulemaking Authority of the SEC
Section 211(a) of the Advisers Act provided the rulemaking authority
for the SEC to rely on in its amendment to the Safe Harbor Rule. 4 9 More
specifically, Section 211(a) affords the ability to "classify and prescribe
different requirements for different classes of people and allows the SEC to
issue, amend and rescind rules as are necessary or appropriate., 50 Irrespective
of the SEC's broad authority, it is permissible for an appropriate court to set

45 Liffman, supra note 40, at 2173; see also Gibson, supra note 10, at 681, (citing Hearingbefore

the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106 th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Anne Nazareth,
Director of Division of Market Regulation, S.E.C., Concerning the Report of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets on Hedge Funds, Leverage and the Lessons of Long-Term
Capital Management), available at 1999 WL 16947258).
46 Liffman, supra note 40, at 2174.
47 Dowd, supra note 44, at 1.
48 id.
41 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 1(a) (2000).

50 Bolter, supra note 3, at 599.
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aside the Commission's rule if it is said to be inconsistent with the underlying
Congressional intent. 51 In assessing such intent, the reviewing court must
consider whether Congress has directly addressed the issue, whether the statute
is ambiguous as to the issue or whether the Commission's amendment was
based on a permissible reading of the legislative history.52
Arguably, the legislative history of 203(b)(3) ("Small or Private
Adviser Exemption") provides for the Commission's ability to maintain broad
authority in their interpretation of the rule. This is because the Small Adviser's
Exemption leaves unanswered the "question as to whether advisers are entitled
to the no "Look Through" provision in counting beneficial owners of entities
other than business development companies (more commonly known as venture
capital companies) as single "clients. 53 Additionally, there is no history
addressing the purpose behind the 15 client rule within the Small Adviser
Exemption.54 Therefore, at first glance, the Commission is presumptively
justified in its interpretation and implementation of the meaning of the Safe
Harbor Rule, the look through provision and the Private Adviser Exemption.55
However, in the case that the Commission is strikingly inconsistent with
Congress, their interpretation will incur a standard of review comparable to that
of strict scrutiny.56
B. Rule 203(b)(3)-2: Background and Purpose
In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the Advisers Act and the investment advisers who are subject to
the Act are to prevent the continued discrepancies in knowledge between the
investment adviser and their respective clients.57 A fundamental purpose of the

51 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (reasoning that courts need not hold steadfast to an
agency's rulemaking or interpretation of such).
52 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (expressing
that if Congressional intent is clear or if the agency's interpretation is plainly inconsistent with said
intent, the agency has exceeded their allowable scope of authority and the statute must be struck
down).
" H.R. REP. No. 1341, at 4 (1980); see also Boltersupra note 3, at 599; see also 15 U.S.C. §80a2(a)(48) (2006) (defining a business development company as a "closed-end company which
operates for the purpose of making investments in certain securities and making available
significant managerial assistance with respect to the issuers of such securities").
54 id.
55 S.E.C., supra note 3 (where the staff issued a report to the Commission suggesting the
implications of the growth and hedge funds and the proposal that the Commission should consider
requiring hedge fund advisers to register as investment advisers under the Advisers Act).
56 Chevron, 467 US. at 837 (holding that if the agency's authority has violated Congressional
intent, a more exacting standard of review should be applied).
57 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting that the Advisers Act
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Advisers Act was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry. 58 Therein, the Advisers Act defines an
investment adviser as "any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing
or selling securities." 9
An individual who engages in such services
intentionally and not incidentally
is generally required to register with the SEC
60
as an investment adviser.
Hedge fund managers rely on the Small Adviser Exemption or 15
client rule, providing those managers who would normally fit within the
definition of an investment adviser with an exemption from registration. 6 If the
hedge fund manager has not advised more than 15 clients in the preceding 12
months, the managers may properly utilize the exemption. 62 This rule works in
conjunction with the Safe Harbor rule which provides that for purposes of
determining who constitutes a client under § 203(b), investment advisers may
count a "legal organization," such as a corporation or any form of a partnership
as a single client.63

was prompted by Congress' hope that its impact would relieve advisers and their clients of any
conflicts of interests which may be detrimental to a client's best interests). Discrepancies in
knowledge may refer to insider information that an investor's investment adviser may possess and is
reluctant to disclose to the investor due to the possibility of adversely affecting the investor's
portfolio.
58 id.

" 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1) (2000).
60Id. (stating that those professionals such as lawyers or broker-dealers performing services
incidentally and without compensation are not required to register with the SEC).
61 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000) (explaining the circumstances where someone akin to the
definition of an investment adviser need not register with the SEC).
62 Id. (identifying the prerequisites to comply with the Small Adviser Exemption: (1)the adviser
must have no more than 14 clients; (2) must not hold itself out generally to the public as an adviser;
and (3) cannot act as an investment adviser to a registered investment company or development
company). The recently vacated Look-Through Provision temporary removed the Small Adviser
Exemption from investment advisers not generally subject to registration with the SEC.
63 Bolter, supra note 3, at 602; see also 17 C.F.R. §275.203(b)(3)- l(a)(2)(i) (2003) (stating you may
deem the following a single client including "a corporation, general partnership, limited partnership,
limited liability company.. or other legal organization to which you provide investment advice
based on its investment objectives rather than the individuals investment objectives of its
shareholders, partners, limited partners, members or beneficiaries"). The issue of advising
individuals in the form of a shareholder or a partner is yet to be addressed as fiduciary relationships
between the investment adviser and the client are considered in Goldstein. The rule goes on to
clarify that so long as the investment adviser is providing advice to the entity itself and not the
individual, the manager of a legal organization need not "look through to the beneficial owners of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

11

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

Upon the findings spelled out in the Staff Report, the SEC
Commissioners voted to disregard the current Safe Harbor Rule in order to
remove the presumptive secrecy the exemption afforded hedge fund managers
and their private funds. 64 This amendment to the Safe Harbor Rule is arguably
inconsistent with Congressional intent because of §§3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 ("'40 Act"). This broad provision excluded
from the "definition of an investment company any issuer whose securities are
owned exclusively by qualified purchasers (sophisticated investors) and who
does not propose a public offering of such securities., 65 Since hedge funds fit
within this definition as they are private funds who do not engage in the
proposition of public offerings, the Hedge Fund Rule "seemingly contradicts
congressional intent by specifically requiring advisers funds relying on
§§3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) to register under the Advisers Act." 66 Irrespective of
Congressional intent, the SEC went forward with its reinterpretation of the term
"client," prompting the D.C. Circuit's consideration of the rule in Goldstein.
C. The "Client" of a Hedge Fund and the Advisers Act
The definition of a "client" is not defined anywhere within the
Advisers Act but was amended by the SEC to bring hedge fund advisers within
the boundaries of the Commission's registration regulations.67 Until 2004, both
the SEC and Congress were consistent in treating a "legal organization
receiving advice from an investment adviser as a single client, declining to look
through the entity and count individual shareholders as clients. 68 Although the
the organization in counting clients" and as a hedge fund manager generally advises a fund,
although comprised of individuals, the manager will avoid registration under the Advisers Act.
64 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec.
10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 275,279) (defining a private fund as an entity that would be
subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 but for the exceptions provided
under § 3(c)(1) or § 3(c)(7)). Additionally, the private advisers exemptions were narrowed as of
December 2004 through an amendment of Rule 203(b)(3)-l that redefined the term "clients" to
preclude "private funds" in certain circumstances).
61 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-3(c)(7) (2000).
66 Regulation of the Hedge FundIndustry Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 108' h Cong. (2004) (testimony of Adam C. Cooper, Chairman, Managed Funds
Association) (recognized that the currently regulatory framework provides for resources to be
expended on investors who actually need protection and not on those investors who have
demonstrated sophistication and knowledge in their investment objectives); see also Regulation
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69 Fed. Reg. 45, 172
(proposed July 28, 2004) (stating that a "private fund" or hedge fund is ordinarily one that meets the
definition of an investment company, but for its exemption afforded under § 3(c)(1) or § 3(c)(7)).
67Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.
68 Bolter, supra note 3, at 620; see Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Comment Letter
Re: Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266 (File No. S7-30-04): Registration underthe
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SEC broadened the Safe Harbor Rule to encompass hedge fund advisers, it
reaffirmed the plain meaning of a "client. 69 As a result, it seemed that the
SEC, in adopting the Hedge Fund Rule focused more on the Staff Report's
finding that hedge fund growth itself along with changed circumstances has
warranted their changed interpretation.70
The Hedge Fund Rule requiring that each shareholder or beneficiary of
a "private fund," including hedge funds, be considered a separate client in
counting towards the "15 client rule" within the Small Adviser Exemption. 7 1 It
is arguable that the SEC's redefinition of a "client" is inconsistent with
Congressional intent as it is a term so pertinent to the meaning of the Advisers
Act.72 For example, the term "client" is generally accepted as an individual or
organization that receives direct advice from an investment adviser rather than
passive or inactive investors in the legal organization such as those whose only
role is capital contribution. 73 As a result, "not only does the plain language of
the term conflict with the SEC's reinterpretation in the Hedge Fund Rule, but
judicial interpretation and the legislative intent behind the Advisers Act affirm
the longstanding interpretation that a "client" is a party who receives
particularized advice. 74 However, from the SEC's perspective, the
reinterpretation of the term "client" and the implementation of the Hedge Fund
Rule are consistent with the regulatory framework of the securities industry.
The practices of fraud, misuse of leverage and speculation are three enormous
and worrisome issues that the SEC cites to as authority for their change of the
definition of "client., 7 5 As far back as the 1920's and the Depression Era, these
concerns have been prevalent in the securities markets and were problems that
prompted the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933.76 Therefore, the
government had to and did respond by regulating the securities industry "in
77
order to restore public confidence and make capitalism live up to its promise.,

Investment Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2004) (explaining that the
hedge fund adviser provides investment advice to the partnership itself rather than each beneficial
owner), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/wilmerO9O804.pdf; see generally
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(2)(i) (2003).
69 Id.
70 id.

71 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054
(explaining the methods for counting clients for purposes of private funds).
72Bolter, supra note 3, at 602.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 603.

75 Liffman, supra note 40.
76 Id.

77 Id. at 2174.
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In consideration of the Staff Report's findings, the sheer growth of hedge funds
have transcended the private fund boundaries and have dived into the public
arena where the SEC would serve its functional goal of securities regulation
through the registration of hedge fund advisers, requiring them to provide data,
including 7financial and trading practice disclosures for the purpose of protecting
investors.
Even if the SEC was in fact attempting to hold fast to their primary
objective of investor protection, their method in doing so may be inconsistent
with Congress and legislative history. Consistent with regulation is arguably
bestowing registration upon hedge fund advisers since it is overwhelmingly
consistent with the SEC goal of disclosure. However, in considering
Congressional intent, the language of the Advisers Act "advances the argument
that the term "client" refers to a person or organization that receives
personalized investment advice," rather than equating the term "client" with a
legal organization or more specifically a hedge fund.79 Further, it has been
emphasized that the Advisers Act is supposed to administer those situations
where "individualized advice is given specific to a client's particular needs."8 °
Again, a hedge fund's business model does not provide for individualized
advice, as its objectives are to advise the partnership itself, whereby the look
through provision should prevent the SEC from looking through the entity to
the partners themselves. Further evidence of Congressional intent to exclude
private funds or hedge funds from registration under the Advisers Act was at the
recommendation of the SEC, requiring advisers of registered investment
companies, such as mutual funds to register under the Advisers Act.8' Congress
looked to amend the Small Adviser Exemption, explicitly removing the "fewer
than 15" exemption for advisers of companies registered under the '40 Act.82 In
doing so, it is apparent that Congress did not design the Small Adviser
Exemption to "count each individual as a "client," because if that were true,
there would be no need to specifically deny the exemption to advisers of
registered funds. 83 Instead, the provision would have read more broadly and
generally included advisers of private funds. Therefore, it may be argued that
the SEC has not currently justified registration in order to protect investors.

78 Id. at

2176.

79 Bolter, supra note 3, at 602 (arguing that the SEC is guilty of this in their implementation of the

Hedge Fund Rule).
80 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208 (holding that in order to come within the purview of the Advisers Act
individualized advice must be given).
81 Bolter, supra note 3, at 605.
82 id.
83 id.
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D. The "Look Through" Provision
In prompting the challenge in Goldstein, the SEC justified the Hedge
Fund Rule on the supposition that an increasing number of investment advisers
were taking advantage of the Small Adviser Exemption, allegedly providing for
circumvention of the purpose of the rule.84 The SEC contended that investment
advisers created limited partnerships solely to incur the benefits of the
Exemption rather than manage their clients' money directly. 85 To support such
a contention, the SEC cited only a district court case where an investment
adviser persuaded a client to reorganize its trust accounts in order to avoid
regulation. 86 Furthermore, the Proposed Release of the Safe Harbor Rule notes
the rule was strictly available to circumstances where the general partner
advises the partnership based on the fund's investment objectives, not those of
its partners. 87 As a result, contrary to the SEC's belief, it seems the Safe Harbor
Rule was "itself established to prevent circumvention, not solely to exempt
from registration those advisers whose business is so limited that it does not
raise federal interest. ' '88 In other words, the Small Adviser Exemption seems to
reflect that there is no federal interest in regulating investment advice on a
personal level to friends or family. 89 Therefore, as argued in petitioner's
complaint in Goldstein, the use of the "look through" provision by the SEC
functions as an instrument to create new law, rather than a legitimate means of
enforcing the rule's primary objective. 90

Ill. GOLDSTEIN V. SEC
A. Background
Phillip Goldstein, a shareholder activist mainly participating in proxy

Id.at 608.
85 Id. at 609. (citing Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72,054.)
86

SEC v. Gary Smith, No. 93-CV-74410-DT, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352, at *1 (S.D. Mich. Jan.

6, 1995).
87 Liffman, supra note 40.
88Regulation Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69 Fed. Reg.
at 45,199 (dissenting from the majority's opinion that the Hedge Fund Rule is a loophole allowing
advisers to manage the assets of more than 14 clients while remaining unregistered); see also
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.
89Liffman, supra note 40, at 2177 (stating that where critics of this argument suggest that Congress
created the exemption specifically for advisers who have a few clients consisting of family and
friends but did not intend it to be used by fund managers who take advantage of the look through
provision and maintain hundreds of clients).
90 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 873.
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battles, is the President of Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., the general partner of
Opportunity Partners L.P.91 He has been described as "the most visible of a
new breed of closed-end-fund activists known as a fundbuster. ''92 He is a retired
New York City civil engineer operating a $40 million hedge fund from the
basement of his Brooklyn, New York home. Staying true to his activist role,
Goldstein, in conjunction with Kimball and Winthrop and Opportunity Partners,
petitioned for review of an order of the SEC regulating hedge funds under the
Advisers Act via the "Look Through" Provision and the accompanying Hedge
Fund Rule. Previously exempt because Goldstein had fewer than 15 clients, the
SEC's adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule required Goldstein's advisers to
register with the Commission since the funds they advise have fifteen or more
shareholders, limited partners, members or beneficiaries.93
B. Petitioner Goldstein's Argument
Goldstein advances two main theories in order to invalidate the Hedge
Fund Rule. First, Goldstein argues the Hedge Fund Rule violates Congressional
intent by regulating private investment entities and advisers which Congress has
expressly exempted from regulation under the Investment Company Act and
Advisers Act. 94 Goldstein claims the Commission does not have the authority
to regulate hedge funds by rewriting a statute as delineated by Section 211 (a) of
the Advisers Act. 95 Secondly, Goldstein focuses squarely on the definition of
"client" as used in the Advisers Act and argues that it's definition is
unambiguous and clear as interpreted by Congress and as such requires no
further interpretation by the SEC.96 More specifically, Goldstein alleges the
Hedge Fund Rule transforms the term "client" to include the security holders
who have invested in the hedge fund. Goldstein posits the term "client" should
signify the entity or fund itself that engaged the adviser to provide investment
advice to the fund as a whole rather than based on the investment objectives of

91Phillip Goldstein is a hedge fund adviser to Opportunity Partners, a hedge fund partnership and
its general partner, Kimball & Winthrop.
92Blake A. Bell, Do ShareholderActivists Violate FederalProxy Solicitation Laws Through
InternetMessage Boards?, Sept. 15, 1998, http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub275.pdf,
(last visited Jan. 7, 2006) (describing a fundbuster as an activist who seeks to buy shares at deep
discounts and then maneuvers to reduce the discounts, thereby increasing their overall returns vis- .vis the funds' market performance).
9' See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2006).
9' Brief for Petitioner, Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873 (No. 04-1434).
95 See supra section H. A. (where it is argued that the SEC does indeed have broad rulemaking
authority).
96 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 94.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol6/iss1/6

16

Goldstein: A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and their Mysterious Success

HEDGE FUNDS

any individual investor. 97 Additionally, Goldstein diligently contends that the
SEC's regulatory position until the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule was
98
consistent with congressional intent and the Safe Harbor Provision.
Therefore, Goldstein claims the adjustment to the Safe Harbor Provision is
justified solely on arbitrary and capricious grounds where no satisfactory
reasoning is advanced. 99
C. Respondent SEC's Argument
The SEC attempted to take a step away from petitioner's arguments,
focusing on statutory language and the definition of "client" by simply
promoting the need for hedge fund regulation. As previously stated, the SEC
relied on growth in hedge funds and the impact of hedge fund advisers on the
markets, an increase in fraud cases involving hedge fund advisers and an
00
increase in exposure of retail investors to the risks of hedge fund investing.
The growth stems from the increase in hedge fund activity.0 1 As a result,
hedge fund advisers have become significant participants in the national
securities markets since their trading represents a reported 10 to 20 percent of
the equity trading volume in the United States as of December 2004.102 Further,
between 1999 and 2004, the Commission instituted 51 enforcement actions
alleging that hedge fund advisers defrauded either their own investors or other
market participants in amounts estimated to exceed $1.1 billion. 10 3 The
Commission also argues that hedge fund advisers were actively involved in the
recent scandals regarding "late trading" and "market timing" of mutual fund
shares that harmed mutual fund investors.'l 4 Additionally, the SEC focuses on

9 id.

98 Id.; see Lowe, 472 U.S. at 194 (the SEC had recently adopted the safe harbor rule to ensure that
security holders of a limited partnership were not considered "clients" of an adviser to the entity.
The SEC articulated in Lowe that the Advisers Act addressed a client relationship in which an
adviser provided personalized investment advice based upon an understanding of the investment
objectives and the financial situation of the client).
99 Brief for the Petitioner, supranote 94.
10oBrief for Respondent, Goldstein,451 F.3d 873 (No. 04-1434).
1o1Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.
102Brief for the Respondent, supra note 100; see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.
103Brief for the Respondent, supra note 100; see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.
104Brief for the Respondent, supra note 100; see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054; see Banc of Am. Cap. Mgmt., LLC 84 S.E.C. Docket
2780, at *4, (Feb. 9, 2005) (defining 'market timing' as "the practice of "(a) frequent buying and
selling of shares of the same mutual fund or (b) buying or selling mutual fund shares in order to
exploit inefficiencies in mutual fund pricing, both of which can dilute the value of the shares of
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the increased involvement of non-traditional investors or those investors not
generally considered wealthy in the activities of hedge funds. This was a direct
result of hedge funds decreasing their minimum investment capital requirements
through the development of funds of hedge funds and the increase of pension
funds, universities and charitable organization investment.10 5
It seems that the SEC's attempt to justify the Hedge Fund Rule relied
heavily on their goal of protecting the investor rather than promoting or stabilizing
the prominent effect on capitalism that hedge funds employ. However, it seems
consistent with the changing times and economy that the SEC sought out a measure
of regulation for hedge funds since it is clear their services have become available to
those investors who simply can't afford to lose their investments and may in fact do
so without having sufficient knowledge to understand what their investments entail.
Therefore, it is logical to argue that hedge funds and their privatized nature dove
into a realm that is no longer predominately secretive, one that as the SEC correctly
points out, has reached retail investors.
Although Goldstein argued the SEC did not have the authority to adopt
the Hedge Fund Rule and contradicted congressional intent, it is arguable that
registration may have been the correct approach to "gauge the prevalence of
problematic practices that hedge funds currently engage in,"' 0 6 as the Safe
Harbor Provision has not been used in a manner closely related to its purpose. 10 7
For the brief period that registration under the Advisers Act was in effect for
hedge fund advisers, the SEC was able to gather information about the number
of hedge funds which an adviser manages, the amount of assets in the funds,
employees of the funds, clients of the funds, other business activities the adviser
conducts and the identity of those in control of the fund. 10 8 It seems that
disclosure of the information is specifically related to preventing future
instances of fraud and may decrease the likelihood of a disaster comparable to
mutual fund shareholders, disrupt the management of the mutual fund's investment portfolio and
cause the targeted mutual fund to incur costs bome by other shareholders to accommodate frequent
buying and selling of shares by the market timer and defining 'late trading' as "the practice of
placing orders to buy or sell mutual fund shares after the time as of which a mutual fund has
calculated its [net asset value] (usually as of the close of trading at 4:00 p.m. ET), but receiving the
price based on the prior [net asset value] already determined as of 4:00 p.m., thus allowing the
trader to profit from market events that occur after 4:00 p.m. but that are not reflected in that day's
price").
105See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054;
see Jenny Anderson & Riva D. Atlas, If! Only Had a Hedge Fund: Is This the New Emerald City,
or the Road to the Next Crash?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, §3, at 1.
106Liffman, supra note 40, at 2176.
107See Regulation Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69 Fed.
Reg. 45,172.
10 See Liffman, supra note 40, at 2177.
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that of LTCM by recognizing fraud in its early development.
Additionally, registration barred criminals with long criminal records
from managing funds and arguably erased the decrease in minimum investment
problems by compelling compliance with minimum requirements for investors
under rule 205-3 of the Advisers Act.10 9 As a result, it seems that registration
does curb some of the illegal activity and investor abuse that hedge funds attract
and as such the SEC's requirement of registration was rationally related to
hedge fund regulation. However, a rational relationship may not be sufficient
as hedge fund regulation, vis-a-vis registration, has garnered a higher level of
scrutiny since the Hedge Fund Rule has arguably departed from the purpose and
intent of the Safe Harbor Rule. 10
D. The D.C. Circuit's Decision
Statutory Interpretation
The D.C. Circuit held the Hedge Fund Rule to be arbitrary and
capricious on its face and upon its application invalidated the SEC's attempt to
regulate hedge funds vis-a-vis registration.1 The court was emphatic in siding
with Goldstein by agreeing that although the term "client" is not defined in the
Advisers Act, this fact does not confer a right upon the Commission to imply its
own definition on grounds on ambiguity.1 12 Rather than allowing the
Commission to redefine the term "client," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
("court") appropriately considered the legislative history of § 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act dating back to 1970.113 The court points to an amendment in 1970
which in the court's opinion, is a reflection of congressional understanding that
investment company entities, not the shareholders, be it an individual or other
entity, were the advisers' clients.1 14 The court goes on to explain that the
prohibition of a separate exemption for advisers who advised only investment
companies would be unnecessary if the shareholders of investment companies

109 Id.; see Regulation Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69
Fed. at 45,176.
"0 See S.E.C., supra note 3; see Bolter, supra note 3 at 601 (discussing how a reviewing court will

engage in a more scrutinizing analysis where an agency, like the SEC has departed from the
consistent and longstanding precedents or policies where the presumption of agency regulatory
authority has been slighted).
.. See Goldstein 451 F.3d 873.
112 Id. at 878 (explaining that the lack of a statutory definition of a word does not necessarily
render
the meaning of a word ambiguous and the presence of a definition does not necessarily make that
term clear).
113 id.
114 id.
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could be counted as clients. Further, the court implicates the probative value of
a Second Circuit decision its in holding that hedge fund general partners were
investment advisers' 15 under the Advisers Act. Although the Second Circuit did
not explicitly hold that general partners were advisers to the limited partners,
therefore giving merit to the ambiguity of the term "client" as suggested by the
Commission, the mere mention of those words may be construed as reiterating
the definition of a client to not be equal to that of an investor." 6 It seems the
court associates the Commission's reliance on the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the 1980 amendment to demonstrate such ambiguity of "client"
as hypocritical because it was the Commission who established the Safe Harbor
provision in 1985.117
Investment Adviser, "Client" and FiduciaryDuties
With all the doubt surrounding the existence or lack thereof a concrete
definition for the term "client," the court emphasizes the existence of a statutory
definition for the term "investment adviser."' 8 The court reasons that an
investor in a private fund may benefit or suffer directly from the investment
adviser's advice but he does not receive that advice directly like that of a
general retail investment relationship between an investment representative and
an individual who is neither a shareholder nor a corporation." 9 For example, it
is not as if the investor walked into a brokerage and openly discussed his
investment strategy with another investment representative. In the hedge fund
scenario, the investor invests a portion of his assets in the fund and in turn he
receives no direct advice. In a hedge fund, the court explains the fund manager
is the adviser, and in turn, "controls the disposition of the pool of capital in the
fund."'120 Further, it is not the adviser who tells the investor how to spend his
money because the investor made that initial decision when he embarked on
investing in the hedge fund. Acting out the investor-adviser relationship leads
the court to demonstrate the investors' maintenance of a passive role. Since the
person or entity controlling the hedge fund is not an investment adviser by
definition 12 to each individual investor, it follows that each investor can not be

"' 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(l1) (2006).
116Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-71 (2d Cir. 1977).
"' Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879 (explaining that the Safe Harbor provision allowed advisers to count

certain limited partnerships as single clients specifically in order to provide some form of certainty
about the meaning of the term); see Definition of "Client" of Investment Adviser for Certain
Purposes Relating to Ltd Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740 (Mar 5. 1985).
"' Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2000).
19 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879.
20 Id. at 880.

121 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2000).
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a "client" of that person122or entity. As the court explains, "these are just two
sides of the same coin."'
This relationship in and of itself seems simple, fair and may lend
credence to resolve the issue of when an investor receives direct advice from an
adviser and how this situation does not arise in the context of a hedge fund.
Ironically enough, this was the view of the SEC until it issued the Hedge Fund
Rule. 123 The SEC had agreed with the court's reasoning when it provided
hypothetical scenarios demonstrating the impact of individualized advice. 24 As
mentioned above, a "client" of an investment adviser will receive individualized
advice on his investment objectives given his financial situation. But if the
investment adviser works for an investment company or corporation, he will not
and is not required to consider the individual needs of the company's
shareholders when making investment decisions. Also, in contrast to the former
situation with the "client," the adviser is not obligated to ensure that each
security purchased for the company's portfolio is also a financially responsible
investment for each shareholder. 2 5 Coincidentally, it was the SEC and
subsequently the court, who reasoned that when an adviser to an investment
pool manages the assets of the pool on the basis of investment objectives of a
group of investors rather than an individual it seems appropriate to26consider the
pool rather than each individual investor as a client of the adviser.1
Another important aspect which the court considers in Goldstein is the
character of the advice rendered. 27 More specifically, the court cites a Supreme
Court case where it was held that those engaged in the investment advisory
industry will "provide personalized advice to a client's concerns" and a
fiduciary relationship is indicative of the investment adviser-client
relationship. 128 Consistent with the legislative history of the Advisers Act it
seems as though this direct relationship only exists between the adviser and the
hedge fund, but not between the adviser and the investors in the fund.' 29 As
explained above, the adviser is concerned with the fund's performance, not with
each investor's financial status. This is the crux of the case against the
Commission's Hedge Fund Rule and more importantly, the correct

122

Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.

123See Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 62

Fed. Reg. 15, 098, at 15, 012 (Mar. 31, 1997).
124 id.
125 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208).
129Id. (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208).
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interpretation of the intent of the Advisers Act. Therefore, the court is correct
in its assertion that the Commission's interpretation of the term "client" is
beyond reasonable bounds and illegitimately characterizes the investors in a
hedge fund as the "clients" of the adviser.1 30 The court unequivocally refuses to
define the term "client" but makes clear that the Commission's interpretation is
inconsistent with the fiduciary duties owed in the adviser-client relationship
since the adviser owes fiduciary duties to the fund, not the individual
investors. 131 Therein, a breach of the fiduciary duty by the adviser is a violation
of the duty of loyalty owed to the client. 132 This cause of action for breach will
only extend to investors in a hedge fund alleging fraud against the fund's
adviser.' 33Coincidentally, the Hedge Fund Rule expands upon the duty of
loyalty by recognizing that advisers must manage their clients' portfolios in the
best interest of the client and in the result of any conflict of interest the adviser
is obligated to disclose such conflict that exists with the client. 134 A conflict of
interest is assured if the adviser owes a fiduciary duty to the investors and the
hedge fund entity. 135 As the court correctly opines, investment advisers cannot
be the "servants of two masters in this way."'' 36 Therefore, contrary to the
Commission's argument, suggesting that hedge funds are structured with the
intent of avoiding significant legal obligations such as registration with the
Commission, "form does matter in this area [Small Adviser
Exemption] of the
137
law because it dictates to whom fiduciary duties are owed.'
130 Id.
131 id.

13215 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (stating it is "unlawful for any investment adviser... [registered or not,] to
engage in any transaction.. .which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client"); see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (holding that 15
U.S.C. §80b-6 created a fiduciary duty of loyalty between an adviser and his client).
133Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 869-71.
134Regulation Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69 Fed.
Reg. 45,172, at 72,059.
131Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880 (explaining how a conflict of interest will arise if the adviser owes a
fiduciary duty to both the investor and the entity by considering "an investment adviser to a hedge
fund that is about to go bankrupt. His advice to the fund will likely include any and all measures to
remain solvent. His advice to the investor in the fund, however, will likely be to sell." On the same
level, the shareholders in the corporation are not deemed clients of the corporation's lawyer. For
example, an adviser, or more easier understood a lawyer, can't represent both side sides of the same
coin. For the adviser to owe a fiduciary duty to the investors and the fund itself is analogous to a
lawyer representing both the corporation and the shareholders or beneficial owners of a corporation.
Even though the shareholders may indeed benefit indirectly from the lawyer's representation of the
corporation, "their individual interests easily can be drawn into conflict with the interests of the
entity.").
136 Id.
"'

Id. at 883.
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The court is correct in suggesting that the Commission has used an
illegitimate course to require hedge fund regulation. Although the Commission
justifies its Hedge Fund Rule by pointing to the surrounding growth of hedge
funds, an increase in fraud actions and retail exposure, these factors are
inconsistent with manipulating the use of the term "client." The Commission
has failed to explain away the obvious conflict of interests which may occur
amongst fiduciary duties which as a result of the Hedge Fund Rule. Therefore,
the court is correct in its reasoning that the relationship between hedge fund
investors and advisers does not currently justify treating the former as clients of
the latter. 138 Moreover, even if a hedge fund is comprised of separate
investment accounts, which in turn must be counted as separate clients, this is
not evidence to support the claimed relationship between the investor and the
adviser. Even if the alleged activity does exist, the court correctly suggests that
the Commission has not supported the argument that all investors in hedge
funds are clients. If in fact there exists investors within a hedge fund with
different rights or privileges, the Commission may have been successful if they
adequately explained how these rights justify treating each of those investors
with such rights as separate clients. Simply, the court refuses to look past the
Commission's former interpretation14of
the Safe Harbor Rule 39 in order to allow
0
merit.
hold
to
Rule
Fund
the Hedge
The court then correctly explains how it is the Commission who was
responsible for the creation of the Safe Harbor Rule and its Small Adviser
Exemption and in turn the Commission can not carve out another exception to
the rule. The Hedge Fund Rule seems to provide an exception from the Safe
Harbor Rule solely for investment entities that have fewer than one-hundred but
more than fourteen investors.1 4 ' This rule outlandishly creates a situation in
which investment companies with one hundred or fewer investors are exempt
from the Investment Company Act, but those with fifteen or more investors
triggers registration under the Advisers Act. 42 The court goes on to call the
hedge fund rule arbitrary because of its lack of justification for any change in
nature of the investment adviser-client relationship since the Commission only
points to growth and fraud involving hedge funds, not incidents specifically

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(2)(i) (2004), (confirming the court's reasoning that advice to a
collective investment vehicle will allow such vehicle or partnership to be treated as a single client
since the objectives are based on that of a group and not that of individuals).
'4o Goldstein. 451 F.3d at 883.
141 Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l (making available the benefits of the Safe Harbor provision
to hedge funds taking the form of corporations, limited liability companies and business trusts).
42 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
138

"'
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related to the adviser-client relationship. 43 For example, the number of
investors in a hedge fund does not reveal anything about the fund's activities
that relate to the Commission's purported justifications of hedge fund growth,
an increase in fraud and retail exposure. Further, the relationship between the
investor and adviser does not bear upon the nationals securities markets; it is the
volume of assets or level of indebtedness of a hedge fund that determines the
fund's influence on the U.S. securities markets. 144
As a result, the
Commission's justifications for the hedge fund rule are irrational and their
argument for registration is misplaced since it incorrectly targets the
relationship between investment adviser and client.

IV. IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND DOMESTIC
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
A. Asian Markets
It is arguable that the Asian Market Crisis was the catalyst in
prompting international recognition of the hedge fund industry's significant role
in the plight of emerging markets as well as the likelihood of a global regulatory
effort. 145 Given that it was the affected nations who made the emergency call
for regulation, it is worth mentioning that the U.S. regulatory authorities may
have overlooked the need to temporarily halt U.S. hedge fund abuse of the
struggling regions abroad. 146 Surprisingly, the U.S. or the generally stringent
regulatory body that is the SEC allowed for the sudden withdrawal of highly
leveraged activity in Southeast Asia currency trading and other speculative
investments. 147 This lack of intervention by the Commission, whereby their
attention focused squarely on a decidedly arbitrary attempt to regulate hedge
funds domestically was exhibited by the Staff Report's purported focus on the
U.S. market and the overriding concern of rebuilding U.S. investor
confidence. 148 Despite the lack of involvement by the U.S. in international

143 Id.; see Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. F.C.C., 412 F.3d 145, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a

statutory interpretation that results from an unreasonable interpretation of prior agency policy must
be struck down).
'" Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
145 Sherry M. Shore, SEC Hedge Fund Regulatory Implications on Asian Emerging Markets:
Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.563, 564 (2005).
146 Id.
147 id.
148 Id.;

see S.E.C., supra note 3 (the report contains less than a page in a more than a one hundred

page report which is dedicated to offshore hedge fund activity and even then no mention is made of
the trouble brewing in Asian nations including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand where
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hedge fund regulation, several affected Asian nations stepped up to the plate.
Unlike the U.S., the Monetary Authority of Singapore as early as 2002 kept
retail investors informed of the risk involved in hedge fund activity and
implemented certain disclosure requirements. 149 Additionally, rather than
simply claiming the hedge fund industry has become endangered due to retail
exposure in the U.S., both Hong Kong and the United Kingdom installed
regulations to allow hedge fund product offerings to the retail investor. 5 °
Coincidentally, it is Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Kingdom who are
deemed the most active in regulating the hedge fund industry.1 5 1 Further, it is
Hong Kong, rather than the U.S., who took the right approach in trying to
mitigate the risk associated with hedge funds. Hong Kong implemented a
difficult licensing exam for potential hedge fund managers and investment
advisers. 152 It seems odd that the U.S., the most highly sophisticated and wellfunded nation, took an approach akin to hedge fund investment adviser
registration via statutory reinterpretation rather than a means similar to that of
Hong Kong. The SEC criticized a hedge fund's structure before allowing it to
start its operations. Rather than exhibit the unity that the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority maintained when it regulated hedge fund activity, the divisiveness
amongst SEC commissioners likely resulted
in the extensive criticism that
153
domestic hedge fund regulation attracted.
B. Canadian Markets
Since the collapse of two large Canadian hedge funds whose presence
was felt most by retail, the Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission has
designed measures to "ensure that hedge fund managers provide fair, full,
accurate and timely information to their investing clients, [in] addition to
improving transparency surrounding management fees and risk. 54 Most
hedge funds once had a short position in Thai currency so significant that it amounted to
approximately five percent of Thailand's Gross Domestic Product at its peak).
149 See S.E.C., supra note 3.

0 id. at 584.
151

Id.

152 id.

153Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054
(explaining that where the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule ignited great uproar amongst the hedge
fund and financial communities as well as the SEC itself as the SEC commissioners voted 3-2 in
approving the amendment, prompting one of the most publicized and controversial regulatory
conflicts in modem financial history).
154 Id.; see DAVID WILSON, CHAIRMAN, ONTARIO SEC. COMM'N, DIALOGUE WITH THE OSC 2005:
SETTING THE STANDARD (November 17, 2005), available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp-20051117_dw-dialogue-opening-remarks.pdf,
visited January 26, 2007).
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recently, the Ontario Securities Commission announced its intent to force hedge
fund managers to register with regulators and to pass tests to prove their
proficiency. This is likely in response to the collapse of hedge funds Portus
Alternative Asset Management, and Amaranth Advisors who lost $6.5 billion
due to wrong bets on natural gas prices by a Calgary-based trader. 155 For the
sake of the U.S. securities markets, the SEC should coordinate some logical
form of regulation to prevent an occurrence similar to that of the Canadian
hedge funds or the Asian Market crisis.
C. Domestic Alternatives
Since the D.C. Circuit vacated the Hedge Fund Rule, several
alternatives to the rule have gained attention. First, Commissioner Cox
recommended that the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act
should apply only to clients, not to investors in hedge funds, or in the
alternative, examine whether the Advisers Act may proscribe fraud by advisers
against investors in hedge funds. 156 This suggestion seems superfluous given
the overarching and well-defined rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 which suffices to prosecute insider trading and other methods of
securities fraud. If the Commissioner follows through with this antifraud rule, a
subsequent court challenge is imminent.
Citing the Staff Report's finding that hedge fund products have
attracted less wealthy investors through retailization, the Commissioner
suggested that the definition of accredited investor as applied to retail
investment in hedge funds without registration may be worthy of a limited
change. 157 As the foundation of the SEC is investor protection, an individual
with insufficient assets that is investing in a product (like a hedge fund) incurs
high risks encompassing the potential loss of their assets and in turn will need
society to support them. Therefore, the purpose of this law would likely serve
to ensure those with insufficient assets won't lose everything. However, if the
155 Joe Schneider, CSA Plans to Boost Oversightof Hedge Fund Managers,BLOOMBERG, Feb, 20,

2007, available at
http://www.bloomberg.con/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=az 15yhelblcQ&refer=canada, (last
visited February 23, 2007).
156Carol Robinson Schepp, SEC Chairman Cox's Senate Testimony Addressing SEC Hedge Fund
Actions After Goldstein Decision, WILMER HALE, July 26, 2006,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=3292.
157 Id. (explaining that the accredited investor will be redefined to be called an "accredited natural
person" and that person would need a net worth of $1 million, an old requirement, but would also
have to have $2.5 million worth of investable assets, excluding the value of a primary residence.
The proposed rule provides for inflation adjustments, with the first adjustment to $2.5 million to the
nearest $100,000 on April 1, 2012 and an adjustment every five years thereafter); see Regulation
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172.
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purpose of this accredited investor definition is to prevent such a risk, a version
that places a cap on the amount invested in proportion to an investors' net worth
in certain investment categories would be more efficient. Given that it is a
virtual certainty that any legislation significantly amending the text of the
SEC's rules is subject to challenge, amending minimum financial requirements
is a practical solution. Up until now, the SEC's attempt to regulate hedge funds
has seemed overly intrusive and has allegedly precluded the creativity, liquidity
and flexibility of hedge funds that existed prior to the Hedge Fund Rule. At the
same time, the collapse of Amaranth Advisors, a Greenwich, Connecticut based
hedge fund in September of 2006 is a blow to the argument that hedge funds
need not be regulated. 158 In response, it is assumed that local lawmakers will
respond by introducing legislation that would require more disclosure and
eliminate conflicts of interest between investors and fund managers,15 9 laws that
would seemingly resemble that of the vacated Hedge Fund Rule. Although
Connecticut is home to a significant amount of hedge funds, this is a poor idea
by Connecticut regulators. By unilaterally imposing regulations that no other
state has, hedge funds will likely move their offices elsewhere and adversely
affect the state's economy. This transition would be disliked by the federal
government given the revenues contributed to the United States Treasury by
Connecticut's hedge funds. Regulation at the state level is undoubtedly a
catalyst for increased costs and inconsistent rules across state lines.
In order for hedge funds to be as successful as they were previously
and concurrently promote investor protection and confidence, the SEC must
focus its regulation on informing its investors of the risks involved in hedge
fund trading activity without significantly disclosing any trading strategy,
portfolio or irrelevant information. This approach is akin to that of the
Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), the United Kingdom's securities
regulator whose culture provides for daily dialogue with hedge funds.1 60 This
dialogue seems more practical than the SEC's approach because hedge funds
presumably know what the risks are and will have procedures in place so that if
something does indeed go wrong, there is a connection at the FSA or the SEC.
and Dubai have all altered their
Coincidentally, Hong Kong, Singapore, France
61
FSA.1
the
mirror
to
mechanisms
regulatory
158 Hedge-FundLawyers See

New Rules Ahead, Dealbook,

http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/10/27/hedge-fund-lawyers-see-new-rules-ahead/ (Oct. 27,
2006, 10:33 EST).
159Connecticut Considers StricterHedge-FundRules, Dealbook,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com2007/02/09/connecticut-stricter-hedge-fund-rules/ (Feb. 9, 2007,
15:34 EST).
160 Id.

161Stephen Labaton, Officials Reject More Oversight of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, February 23,
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There is also the suggestion that hedge funds themselves should be left
alone, diverting our regulatory resources to those sophisticated and wealthy
investors who so frequently support hedge fund growth. Most recently, the
President's Working Group proposed a series of nonbinding principles, placing
the onus primarily on companies, investors and buyers and sellers of hedge fund
securities to impose a "market discipline."' 162 It has been the large financial
institutions that have brought despair to the economy as well as the homes of
certain American taxpayers. The collapse of Long Term Capital Management
and the Savings and Loan Industry is likely attributable to the insurmountable
levels of leverage taken on by lenders that resulted in economic disaster rather
than the investment decisions of someone with a net worth of a million dollars.
By regulating hedge funds, the SEC arguably has it in reverse. Although some
pension funds invest the funds of unaccredited investors (by the SEC standard
of an accredited investor) in hedge funds, the funds invested are presumably
substantial enough to hire the expertise necessary to evaluate the hedge fund
products. If not, perhaps the SEC needs to promulgate requirements for pension
funds, such as acquiring a minimum level of expertise similar to the idea of an
intermediate financial exam serving to qualify an individual as an eligible
investor. 163 Additionally, the accredited investor standard restricts certain
financial opportunities to the wealthy and supports the "rich get richer" notion.
It is one thing to limit one's freedom of choice. It is another thing entirely to
make sure people have the information they need to make these choices.
Therefore, informing the investors of the risks associated with hedge funds vis-vis pension fund managers is a plausible regulatory mechanism.
CONCLUSION
It is questionable as to how far the SEC can and will go in their
subsequent attempt to regulate hedge funds. The boundaries of patience and
efficiency will be tested as hedge funds may look to the advantages of offshore
fund establishment as regulation may hinder the foundations of financial
success generated in the private sector. If the majority of hedge fund assets do
2007, at Al.
162

id.

163Many Investors Fume over Hedge-FundRule, Dealbook,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/02/1 2/many-investors-fume-ove-hedge-fund-rule/ (Feb. 12,
2007, 12:37 EST) (explaining that board members of pension funds are charged with the task of
making asset allocation decisions which undoubtedly play into the hedge fund business model.
These assets come from the salaries and savings of individuals who do not necessarily meet the
SEC's accredited investor standard such as that of a firefighter contributing to his local county's
pension plan. Therefore, a wealth requirement such as the accredited investor standard is seemingly
missing a large portion of investors whose assets find their way into hedge fund products).
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indeed find their way offshore, thus potentially incurring virtually zero
transactional disclosure or prohibitions, the largest and most liquid securities
market that is the U.S. will undoubtedly face a situation analogous to that of
driving foreign issuers of initial public offerings ("IPO") to register with foreign
exchanges rather than entering the U.S. capital markets.' 64 If a statute is written
in haste like that of the Hedge Fund Rule, subsequent measures will serve as
barriers to further enhancement of the U.S. securities markets.

In fact, of the top 25 global IPOs in 2005, only one took place in the U.S. Prior to Sarbanes
Oxley's implementation, in 2000, 9 of the top 10 were listed on U.S. soil; see W. Carson McLean,
The Sarbanes Oxley Act: A Detriment to Market Globalization & InternationalSecurities
Regulation, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319, 319 (2005).
'64
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